自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
 

中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2011年06月第17卷第3期
   
本文已被:浏览2160次    下载580次   在线阅读458
文章编号:1672-3104(2011)03-0021-05
 
资源型产业并购重组中的博弈分析
 
李红,史春芬
 
(山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山西太原,030006)
 
摘  要: 在资源紧缺的背景下,通过兼并重组来提高产业集中度,提升产品附加值,对加强资源型产业的市场竞争力及地区可持续发展能力都具有重要意义。在市场经济环境中,兼并重组可以被看作是博弈过程。为了促进企业并购,建立了以大型集团企业为并购方和地方骨干企业为被并购方作为主要研究对象的不完美信息动态博弈模型,对并购双方的博弈过程进行了深入的分析。结合经验发现,虽然政府参与了资源型产业的重组整合过程,但是并购主体依然有必要详细搜集对方信息,慎重选择并购方案,或者判断是否接受并购方案。经过充分博弈过程的并购,将有利于并购后的企业发展和重组整合战略的全面推广。
 
关键字: 资源型产业;企业并购;不完美信息动态博弈;完美贝叶斯均衡;大型企业集团;地方骨干企业
 
 
Gaming for mergers and acquisitions in resource-intensive industries
 
LI Hong, SHI Chunfen
 
(Shanxi University of Finance & Economic, Taiyuan 030006, China)
 
Abstract: In the context of resource scarcity, it is of importance for resource-intensive industries to implement reorganization strategy to raise industry intensity, employ advanced technology, enhance value-added, and improve the competitiveness of the industries and the sustainability of the community. It is noted that reorganization of industries involves game process under the market economy. In this paper, dynamic game models with imperfect information have been built up to facilitate the proceeding of merges and acquisitions, in which the decision behaviors of large corporations as merging side and local major enterprises as merged side are tested with a deep analysis of the game process. It is found that it is still necessary although government would participate in the reorganization process of the resource-intensive industries, it is still necessary for the merging parties to make decisions on the merging scheme based on information collected in every respect. Moreover, because the merging parties have communicated fully, it can be concluded that the gaming process will contribute to the after-merging operation and development of the enterprises and the overall implementation of reorganization strategy as well.
 
Key words: resource-intensive industries; enterprises’ mergers and acquisitions; dynamic game with imperfect information; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; large corporations; local major enterprises
 
 
版权所有:《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》编辑部 
地 址:湖南省长沙市岳麓区麓山南路932号     邮编: 410083
电 话: 0731-88830141
电子邮箱: znsk@csu.edu.cn 湘ICP备09001153号